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Abstract
Cheap talk, mainly in the form of promises, has shown to increase
the efficiency in bilateral exchanges and to promote cooperation. This
paper provides evidence of consistent behavior when messages aim-
ing to directly update the recipients’ second order beliefs, instead of
updating first order beliefs as promises do, are exchanged. Artisanal
fishermen played a common pool resource game in which they were
allowed to send simultaneous non-binding recommendations to their
exogenously predefined neighbors. Building a link between experimen-
tal behavior and survey data, I found that the preferences for being
consistent (i.e. for minimizing the difference between the extraction
level and the outgoing recommendation) are negatively correlated with
the earnings considered as satisfactory by the fishermen that took part
in the study, but they are not correlated with their realized earnings.
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1 Introduction
Costless and non-enforceable communication preceding social interactions is
labeled in economic theory as “cheap-talk”. To this category belongs the
revelation of private attributes, intentions and beliefs; and, theoretically, its
usefulness on subsequent stages depends on whether the strategic setting
emulates a coordination problem or a pure conflict situation (Farrell and
Rabin, 1996). The exchanged information is considered useful in coordination
problems, in which messages are credible and commit both parties to select
symmetric strategies; but are less successful when the interests of the different
parties are not well aligned.
Nevertheless, experimental evidence support the impact of cheap-talk be-
yond coordination games. For bargaining games, in which incentives are
not only misaligned but certainly opposed, false statements about private
information and non-credible threats affect the outcome of the game (Cro-
son et al., 2003). Another example is provided by Ellingsen and Johannes-
son (2004), in which cheap-talk is introduced in a trust game in form of
promises and threats. Their main finding, that promises are more credible
than threats, suggests the existence of a personal cost of being inconsistent.
The role of promises, and the reasons why they are often credible by
the receiver and kept by the proposers, has been studied experimentally by
economists and social psychologists (Loomis (1959); Ellingsen and Johan-
nesson (2004); Charness and Dufwenberg (2006); Vanberg (2008)). Promises
are considered a useful mechanism in the tranmission of intentions. However,
there are still competing explanations on why promises are honored. Apart
from the preferences for consistency, some alternatives explanations are the
disutility derived from guilt aversion and a psychological bias known as the
false consensus effect.
In this paper I show that the influence of cheap-talk in strategic behavior
can be extended to the exchange of second order beliefs of players’ inten-
tions. I conduct an artifactual field experiment emulating the extraction of
a common pool resource in which participants have the chance to exchange
simultaneous non-binding recommmendations with a set of neighbors defined
by an exogenous network. The messages consist on written numbers regard-
ing the extraction level recommended to the nodes with whom they were
connected.
I find that the distance between what is recommended and what is ex-
tracted follows a symmetric distribution centered around zero. This result
reflects, in first instance, a divergence from a “babbling equilibrium” in which
exchanged information is meaningless (Farrell and Rabin, 1996). In second
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instance, this pattern is useful to evaluate individual behavior in presence of
a tradeoff between consistency, pursued by making credible their outgoing
message by following it; and responsiveness, by taking the incoming message
as credible and therefore using it as a coordination device.
The relevance of recommendations in the experimental data lead this
work to reconsider the necessary conditions that make cheap talk effective.
Although promises and recommendations are non-binding, only recommen-
dations are altering the recipient’s expectations regarding the sender’s be-
havior. If a message like “I promess you that I’ll choose X” is replaced by
another one of the form “I recommend you to choose X”, and is still observed
an effect of pre-play communication, then we can state that interpersonal
commitment is not necessary to raise efficiency via cheap talk.
Preferences for consistency are heterogeneous among subjects, but they
can also have some degree of plasticity and be heterogeneous across environ-
ments. I also explore if individuals are equally likely to deviate from their
own recommendation regardless of the others’ expected behavior or, on the
contrary, if cooperative environments strengthen the consistency preferences
while less cooperative environments are seen as an excuse to lie without
harming the self-image (Mazar et al., 2008). To tackle this question, I ex-
ploit an exogenous variation in the expected cooperation levels derived from
the between-subjects experimental design. Using this variation, I show that
the distance between what is recommended and what is extracted is shifted
towards lower consistency levels in less cooperative environments. Neverthe-
less, the proportion of highly consistent subjects remains roughly stable for
large increases in the average extracted level.
Connecting the experimental findings with survey data, I found a neg-
ative and significant correlation between the degree of consistency and the
earnings reported by fishermen as satisfactory for a week of work, but not
with their realized weekly income. This result contributes to the existing
literature merging laboratory and field data to establish clearer connections
between behavior under controlled environments and the likelihood to use
less sustainable fishing technologies (Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
a brief revision of the literature regarding cheap talk, the determinants of
promise keeping at the theoretical and experimental level, and the evidence
of the use of recommendations in public good games. In Section 3 I describe
the experimental design and discuss which explanations for consistency may
be extended from promises to recommendations. Experimental results are
presented in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes the results and concludes.
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2 Existing literature
2.1 What makes cheap talk effective?
According to Farrell and Rabin (1996), an exchanged message must be self-
signaling and self-committing to be relevant in the decision-making process.
Suppose there is a set of two strategies X and Y and subjects can communi-
cate their intended play. A given message is self-signaling when the receiver
knows that the sender does not have incentives to say X and then do Y .
The message is self-committing when the receiver knows that if he believes
the message X and the sender is aware of that, the sender does not have
incentives to play Y . These conditions are satisfied in coordination games,
but are less likely to be held in presence of a conflict of interests between
subjects.
Now suppose that the message allowed to exchange is not of the form “(I
promise) I will play X,” but instead has the form “I recommend you to play
X” as in the experimental setting described in this work. Both are intended
to update beliefs, but the recommendation is directly updating the second
order beliefs. While the message “(I promise) I will playX” intends to update
the receiver’s beliefs of the sender’s intentions, i.e. the first order beliefs;
the message “I recommend you to play X” intends to update the receiver’s
beliefs of the sender’s expectations of the receiver’s intentions. Interpersonal
commitment is only induced if the first order beliefs are directly affected by
the exchange of information, which may occur with promises but not with
recommendations.
An additional feature of the game affecting cheap talk’s effectiveness is
the available information regarding the counterpart’s play. Charness and
Grosskopf (2004) find that learning about the other subject’s payoffs in-
creases the salience of cheap talk in coordination games. Given the ran-
dom rematching after each interaction, the effect is explained as driven by
a regret-satisfaction mechanism. For cooperation dilemmas with repeated
interactions this information is also helpful as a reputation building mecha-
nism, making lying behavior more costly at early stages of the game (Kreps
et al., 1982).
Therefore, it is possible to define three conditions related to the cheap
talk effectiveness: the intensity of the conflict dimension, the inducement of
interpersonal commitment, and the identification of individual behavior.
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2.2 Why do we keep our promises?
Standard economic models assume that agents do not have preferences for
honesty or against deceiving in a particular situation (Gneezy (2005); Demiche-
lis and Weibull (2008)). If deceiving is materially beneficial, an individual
will lie irrespective of the consequences on the other. If any, the incurred
costs of lying will be derived from strategical reasons (Kreps et al. (1982);
Koukoumelis et al. (2012)).
Developments in psychological game theory gave origin to models with a
stronger interdependence between players’ beliefs and utilities (Geanakoplos
and Stacchetti, 1989). To understand how inconsistency may decrease our
utility level, and therefore affect our decisions, two alternative explanations
have been proposed and tested empirically. Guilt-aversion, defined as the
disutility of not fulfilling the other’s expectations (Charness and Dufwen-
berg, 2006), and lie-aversion, suggesting the existence of a fixed cost of lying
(Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004). A third rival explanation, not based on
the existence of social preferences but rather on a psychological bias, is known
as the false consensus effect (Ross et al., 1977).
Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)’s model of guilt aversion suggests that
a subject might inflict harm on a relationship partner by letting him down.
This unfulfillment of expectations can occur through two different mecha-
nisms. A subject may experience simple guilt when the counterpart is let
down by its actions; but also he may experience guilt from blame if he cares
about the counterpart’s inference of being let down, even if it was caused
by someone else’s action. Experimental evidence in favor of simple guilt is
provided in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Charness and Dufwenberg
(2010) by introducing promises in a modified trust game. To the best extent
of my knowledge, the guilt from blame mechanism has not been explored
experimentally.
Under the lie-aversion hypothesis the disutility of being inconsistent is
created by the lying act per se, irrespective on its consequences on the other.
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) conduct a trust game in which messages
from the truster and the trustee are considered promises and threats respec-
tively. They find that promises are more credible than threats, and propose a
model combining preferences for fairness and for consistency to explain their
results. This view of self-deception as individually costly is also explored in
an experimental setting in Mazar and Ariely (2006) and Mazar et al. (2008).
They found that when participants have a chance to cheat without being de-
tected, on average they cheat at low to moderate levels that do not interfere
with their self-image utlity.
Vanberg (2008) proposes a modified dictator game to disentangle the
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effects of guilt-aversion and lie-aversion. Pre-play communication between
paired subjects allows them to make promises before the random selection of
the dictator. Half of the dictators are then reshuffled to a different partner,
blocking for them the disutility of not fulfilling the recipient’s expectations.
The author finds support for the lie-aversion hypothesis given the low share
of self-advantageous decisions made by reshuffled dictators1.
An alternative explanation is the false consensus effect. This psychologi-
cal bias, originally reported in Ross et al. (1977), states that people usually
overestimate the likelihood that other’s perceptions and thoughts matches
their own. Ellingsen et al. (2010) argue that the preferences for consistency
observed in previous experiments were mainly driven by the consensus ef-
fect. In their setting the expectations from second movers are unexpectedly
revealed to the first movers in a dictator game and a trust game, reducing the
bias from the consensus effect. The authors show that, after this information
is revealed, receiver’s expectations are poorly correlated with the sender’s
actions.
Bacharach et al. (2007) propose an independent experiment reaching an
equivalent conclusion, in which they claim that trust is self-fulfilling. A sub-
ject is “trust-responsive” if he will trust the other because he believes the
other trust him. Although they do not mention it, this is a direct manifesta-
tion of the consensus effect described above. Subjects played a simultaneous
trust game with elicitation of first and second order beliefs, i.e., the truster’s
belief that the trustee will fulfil and the trustee’s belief about the truster’s
belief that he will fulfil. After accounting for reciprocity and inequality aver-
sion, the authors find support for the existence of trust responsiveness: the
higher the second order beliefs, the larger the probability that the trustee
fulfils.
2.3 Recommendations in n-players cooperation dilemmas
Pre-play communication is well-known as an efficiency enhancing institution
for collective action problems (Ostrom et al., 1994; Sally, 1995). However, in
the initial experiments was not possible to disentangle the effect of face-to-
face interactions from the effect of the information per se; and was neither
possible to determine if bilateral communication was a necessary condition
to reach efficient agreements.
1In this experiment dictators were not choosing between different allocations of a fixed
endowment. Instead, they were choosing between a self-advantageous allocation without
risk and a lottery for himself that in addition gives a positive and fixed payoff to the
recipient
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Recent laboratory experiments have explored in isolation the role of asym-
metric recommendations in n-players social dilemmas. That is, a single sub-
ject is chosen to send a recommendation to the other group members in a
public goods game. Levy et al. (2011) show that contributions substantially
increase when the subject is randomly selected or endogenously chosen by a
voting procedure, but recommendations do not have an effect if players know
that these are public and exogenous signals provided by the experimenter.
Koukoumelis et al. (2012) expand this result to one-shot public good games
in which individual contributions are public information.
3 Experimental design
3.1 The common-pool resource game
The game is characterized by n users sharing a common-pool resource (CPR
hereafter) under an open access scheme. Subjects must decide, in each round,
their desired extraction level xi ∈ {x, x¯}. Earnings are increasing and concave
in xi, and decreasing linearly with the group’s aggregate extraction
∑n
i=1 xi
as is shown in equation (1).
pii(xi, x−i) =
(
axi − bx
2
i
2
)
+ γ
(
nx¯−
n∑
i=1
xi
)
(1)
The Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game is given by xNEi =
a−γ
b
and
the per capita socially optimum (SO) extraction level is xSOi =
a−nγ
b
. The
parameter values are set as in Ca´rdenas (2004): a = 60; b = 5; γ = 20;
n = 5; x = 1 and x¯ = 8. Replacing these values we have that xNEi = 8 and
xSOi = 1
2.
Subjects initially interacted for five rounds without any kind of commu-
nication. This was the first stage of the game. The only feedback received
at the end of each round was the group’s aggregate extraction3.
The timing of each round in the first stage goes as follows4: (i) Each
participant chooses its extraction level. (ii) The experimenter collects the
individual decisions and announces publicly the group’s aggregate extraction.
Round’s earnings are calculated individually.
2For our parameteres the extraction level socially desirable is negative. However, given
that x = 1 I will define this value as our per capita social optimum.
3This information was sufficient for participants to calculate their round’s earnings
using the payoffs table. If they need help in their calculations they received assistance
from the monitor.
4Full instructions are available in the Appendix.
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The recommendations are introduced during the second stage of the
game. Before starting this stage, that lasted ten rounds, the experimenter
announced that all the players were allowed to suggest an extraction level to
their neighbors. Each subject’s neighborhood was determined by an exoge-
nous network structure shown by the experimenter with the help of a poster.
The poster indicated the nodes, one per subject, and its connections to the
other nodes. The communication network was common knowledge, but the
specific node of each subject remained as private information. Players were
told that the messages had the form “I recommend you to choose Z”, where
Z was a number between x = 1 and x¯ = 8. They had to write the recom-
mended extraction in their decision sheet. The experimenter was in charge
to collect all the recommendations and deliver them to their corresponding
recipients5.
The timing of each round in the second stage goes as follows: (i) each
participant writes a number between 1 and 8, corresponding to the units
that he will recommend to his neighbors to extract. In case that he does
not want to send any recommendation, he could write “NO” instead of a
number. If this is the case, his neighbors receive a blank card instead of a
numbered one. (ii) The experimenter collects the recommendations and put
them in a board designed to show each message only to the recipient. Players
were insistently informed that the incoming messages were non-binding. (iii)
The experimenter delivers, privately, the recommendations to each node.
(iv) Each participant chooses its extraction level. (v) The experimenter
collects the individual decisions and announces publicly the group’s aggregate
extraction. Round’s earnings are calculated individually.
3.2 Treatment cells
The experimental design introduces two different network structures. A star,
in which non-central players exchange messages exclusively with the central
node; and a (directed) cycle, in which messages are transmitted in such a
way that no player is sending and receiving a message from the same node
(see Figure 1).
In two thirds of the sessions a subject, the one assigned to node A, was
randomly selected to send a predetermined recommendation during all the
second stage. The message sent by node A was determined by a coin toss6.
5Avoiding face-to-face communication was crucial to block confounding effects of the
interplay with others (Ca´rdenas and Ostrom, 2004; Bicchieri and Lev-on, 2007)
6To guarantee that the other players did not suspect about the identity of node A, the
coin was tossed during an individual talk with each participant. For the remaining four
subjects, this one-to-one conversation was used to verify that the neighbor structure and
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Figure 1: Networks for transmission of non-binding suggestions
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D
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star (directed) cycle
Depending on the coin’s outcome the subject must send a low extraction
suggestion of 1 unit, which I call the good message; or a high extraction
suggestion of 8 units, the bad message. In the remaining third of sessions
the subjects located in node A were free to choose their desired message in
each round. This is our endogenous message variation of the game. Under
all three conditions subjects in node A were reminded that they were free to
choose their extraction level, independently of the outgoing suggestion. The
experimental design is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Experimental design
Node A’s Network structure
recommendation Cycle Star
Endogenous message cycle-E star-E
Good message (1) cycle-1 star-1
Bad message (8) cycle-8 star-8
In the cycle the node A was symmetric to the other nodes, meaning that
the exogenous recommendation was reaching only one subject. In the star
the node A was at the center of the network; which means that the good,
bad and endogenous messages reached the remaining four nodes. In addition,
these messages were common knowledge.
The treatments defined by a star network with predetermined recommen-
dations provide us the exogenous variation in the expected cooperation levels
required to test the plasticity of the preferences for consistency.
Before proceeding to describe the field setting I will discuss why I do
not consider that the manipulation of the exogenous recommendations sent
by node A implies deception. A potential concern is that participants in the
the new instructions of the second stage were understood.
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other nodes did not know that node A was sending a predetermined recomm-
mendations. However, it did not implied the disclosure of false information.
The protocol did not say that the received message was endogenously se-
lected by the player in node A, neither the contrary. Honesty does not imply
revealing everything to the participants. In fact, an excess of information
may increase the effect of the experimenter demand (Ellingsen et al., 2010).
In this particular design, the most probable result of revealing the exo-
geneity of the central node’s recommendations would be a replication of the
null effect of the exogenously provided coordination mechanisms reported in
Levy et al. (2011).
An additional minor concern would be that participants in the node A
perceive the exogenous outgoing message as an imposition to themselves.
Nevertheless, it was insisted to them that their action set remained unre-
stricted, regardless of the transmitted suggestion.
3.3 Field setting
The experiment was conducted in June of 2012 in Cispata´ Bay, in the north-
western region of Colombia bordering the Caribbean sea. 145 of a total of
150 participants were fishermen from the zone. The remaining five were
members of fishermen households. 26.9% of the fishermen were dedicated
exclusively to fishing, the rest of them combine this task with other eco-
nomic activities, principally agriculture (40.7%). The fishing technologies
used more often were drift nets (45.0%), handlining or line-fishing (35.0%)
and cast nets (27.1%). Confirming the fishermen’s low income reported in
previous literature (Rojas and Sierra-Correa, 2010), I find that the average
income in our sample corresponds to the 62.6% of the Colombian minimum
wage7.
The participants were also asked about the earnings level that they will
consider as satisfactory after a journey of work. While the average daily earn-
ings are 11,968 cop (in an alternative specification, in which weekly earnings
are divided by five instead of by seven, the daily average earnings are 16,755
cop), the satisfactory earnings are on average 27,677 cop. The average ratio
between satisfactory and realized earnings is 2.72 with a standard deviation
of 2.52 (1.94 in the alternative specification, with a standard deviation of
1.80).
7The daily minimum wage for 2012 was of 18,890 Colombian pesos (cop).
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3.4 The effectiveness of recommendations
Could the effectiveness of cheap talk be extended, in theory, from promises
to recommendations? And most importantly, how the experimental design
proposed in this work could be useful to address this question? To tackle
these inquiries it is necessary to evaluate the three conditions mentioned in
Subsection 2.1: the intensity of the conflict dimension, the inducement of
interpersonal commitment, and the identification of individual behavior.
The conflict dimension is characteristic of CPR games: earnings are in-
cresing in individual extraction levels and decreasing in aggregate extraction
levels. Assuming self-regarding precerences, the only message that could be
self-signaling and self-committing will be the extraction level x¯. Any rec-
ommendation below this value will not be self-signaling nor self-committing,
since the sender of the message will always have individual incentives to
deviate upwards.
The identification of individual behavior is not possible, since the only
feedback after each round is the aggregate extraction of the group. The ex-
post inference of individual actions required for the regret-satisfaction and
the reputational mechanisms to work is very noisy in our experimental set-
ting. Therefore, the informational condition required to evidence preferences
for consistency could be relaxed to the observability of aggregated behavior
instead of individual behavior.
Regarding the inducement of interpersonal commitment, the analysis can
be reformulated as a discussion of the mechanisms that can be extended
from promise keeping to the exchange of recommendations. To begin with,
guilt-aversion, the expectation based mechanism, is ruled out from our anal-
ysis. Recommendations are expected to directly update the receiver’s ex-
pectations regarding what the sender is expecting from him (i.e. the second
order beliefs), skipping the update of the receiver’s expectations regarding
the sender’s actions (i.e. the first order beliefs). As the fulfillment of sec-
ond order expectations depends only on the receiver’s behavior, the sender
cannot suffer a disutility from its potential guilt aversion.
Lie-aversion, based on self-commitment rather than on interpersonal com-
mitment, is one of the mechanisms that might sustain the relevance of ex-
changed recommendations. In terms of self-commitment, or consistency be-
tween what is said and what is subsequently chosen, a neglected outgoing
recommendation may generate a similar disutility than a broken promise.
Although average small distances between the chosen and the recommended
extraction levels are part of the behavioral hypothesis, it is important to
remark that full consistency cannot be expected given the tradeoff with re-
sponsiveness due to the simultaneous exchange of messages.
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The other mechanism that might explain consistency in this scenario is
the false consensus effect. Given that recommendations are intended to up-
date second order beliefs, an incoming message close to the recipient’s expec-
tations can magnify this consensus effect, as the subject could erroneously
infer that the beliefs of the rest of the group matches the received message.
One weakness of this work is that the experimental data reported here does
not allow to disentangle the effects between this psychological bias and the
lie-aversion preferences.
4 Results
4.1 Distribution of recommendations
The distribution of outgoing recommendations is separately shown for each
treatment cell in Figure 2. The first column in each panel is labeled “NO,”
and corresponds to the cases in which subjects decline to send a suggestion.
The next columns correspond to the extraction levels from 1 to 8. The
dark bars indicate the number of endogenous messages for each extraction
level, and the light bars indicate the exogenous recommendations of 1 and
8 units in the corresponding treatments. In the remaining of this paper all
the subjects sending predetermined messages are excluded from the sample.
The distribution of suggestions has full support for all the treatments. The
same patterns from Figure 2 are also observed when the distributions are
computed only for the last five rounds of the stage. The average (endogenous)
recommendation for ten rounds is 3.58 units, while for the last five rounds it
slightly increases to 3.63 units.
The distributions also evidence between-treatments variation. They are
skewed to the left for the cycle-1, star-E and star-1 ; and their cumula-
tive distributions for a recommendation of 4 units are 75.8, 83.2 and 78.4
percent respectively. These distributions are not statistically different from
each other according to a pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p-values are
reported on Table 2). On the other hand, the recommendations in the cycle-
E and the star-8 are not skewed towards more cooperative messages, and
they are not statistically different from each other. For these treatments, the
cumulative distributions for a recommendation of 4 units reach 58.2 and 55.6
percent respectively. The distributions in the cycle-E and the cycle-8 either
differ statistically, but the latter is different from the star-8 distribution.
The rate of unsent messages exhibits a large variation between network
structures. 26 out of the 28 cases in which a subject preferred to not send a
message appear in the star, half of them in the one with an exogenous bad
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Figure 2: Histogram of sent recommendations by treatment
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Table 2: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of endogenous
recommmendations’ distributions
Cycle-E Cycle-1 Cycle-8 Star-E Star-1
Cycle-1 (0.000)***
Cycle-8 (0.444) (0.007)***
Star-E (0.000)*** (0.430) (0.000)***
Star-1 (0.000)*** (0.108) (0.018)** (0.556)
Star-8 (0.602) (0.000)*** (0.019)** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
message. Despite that subjects declined to send a message in only 2% of the
cases, our data reveals that message dismissal is positively correlated with
the presence of a central node.
4.2 Distribution of preferences for consistency
I define the inconsistency of player i in round t as the difference between
the chosen extraction level and the outgoing recommendation. Low differ-
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ences between what is done and what is recommended correspond to low
inconsistency levels. The distribution of inconsistency is shown in Figure 3
disaggregated at the subject × round level. For all treatments, except Star-8,
the modal value is zero. The statistical tests reported in Table 3 show that
for the treatments with a cycle structure the mean does not differ statisti-
cally from zero. Given that the distributions for the Star-E and Star-1 are
skewed to the right, the mean value of inconsistency is positive and statisti-
cally significant. In addition, it is also possible to reject that they follow a
normal distribution. For the Star-8, despite that the mean inconsistency is
positive, the normality of the distribution cannot be rejected.
Figure 3: Inconsistency distribution by treatment (only endogenous
recommendations)
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Table 3: Mean and normality test for inconsistency distributions
Cycle-E Cycle-1 Cycle-8 Star-E Star-1 Star-8
Mean 0.096 0.276 0.255 0.547*** 1.041*** 1.123***
(0.570) (0.107) (0.163) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Normality test (χ2) 0.52 6.18** 1.62 13.38*** 6.73** 1.67
(0.770) (0.045) (0.445) (0.001) (0.035) (0.436)
Exogenous recommendations excluded. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
On average, the difference between what is recommended and what is
played is at most one unit for 49.7% of the observations (51.4% if the Star-8
treatment is omitted in the calculation). This result supports the presence
of lie-aversion preferences in the transmission of recommendations. This
14
proportion of observations is not negligible considering the existing trade-
off between consistency, to foster the credibility of the outgoing message;
and responsiveness, by using the incoming recommendation for coordination
purposes. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the observations with high in-
consistency levels remains open, particularly for those in which the outgoing
recommendation exceeds the selected extraction level.
4.3 The interplay of consistency and extraction levels
Four behavioral types are defined as a function of the subjects’ outgoing
recommendations and extraction levels. The cooperative behavior is char-
acterized by a low extraction and a low recommendation. The lie-averse
behavior is characterized by low inconsistency levels, but now defined by
high extracted and recommended levels. The predatory behavior consists
on inducing low extraction levels among the other subjects by sending low
recommendations, and then take individual advantage by choosing high ex-
traction levels. Finally, there is a set of observations kept as non-classifiable
because they are characterized by high recommendations levels followed by
low extraction levels.
The share of observations catalogued according to each behavioral type
are reported in Table 4. Recommendations and extraction levels are consid-
ered “low” if they reach at most 4 units, and “high” if they are of at least 5
units.
Table 4: Percentage of each behavior type (by treatment)
Behavior
Treatment Cooperative Lie-averse Predatory Non-classifiable
Cycle-E 37.4 (93/249) 23.3 (58/249) 20.9 (52/249) 18.5 (46/249)
Cycle-1 59.3 (118/199) 14.1 (28/199) 16.6 (33/199) 10.1 (20/199)
Cycle-8 48.0 (96/200) 17.0 (34/200) 18.0 (36/200) 17.0 (34/200)
Star-E 67.5 (131/194) 9.8 (19/194) 14.4 (28/194) 8.3 (16/194)
Star-1 50.0 (97/194) 15.0 (29/194) 28.4 (55/194) 6.7 (13/194)
Star-8 22.9 (43/187) 33.2 (62/187) 32.6 (61/187) 11.2 (21/187)
Aggregate 47.7 (559/1,173) 18.7 (219/1,173) 21.7 (254/1,173) 12.0 (141/1,173)
Unit of observation is player per round.
Three patterns emerge from the between-treatments comparison. First,
the treatments with the distribution of recommendations more shifted to
the left have also the larger and smaller proportions of cooperative and lie-
averse behavior, respectively. Second, the between-treatments variance of
cooperative behavior is relatively large (2.09%); but the variance of the joint
share of cooperative and lie-averse is almost as low as the share of predatory
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behavior (0.52% and 0.43%, respectively). Third, the proportion of “non-
classifiable” behavior is on average 8.3% for the three treatments with more
cooperative behavior and 15.6% in the other three.
The lower proportion of “non-classifiable” in the treatments with more
cooperative behavior not entirely intuitive. If this behavior would reflect mere
random play it would be equally distributed across all treatments. However,
data suggests that “non-classifiable” is capturing more than a subset of sub-
jects that did not understand the game instructions. In fact, there is only a
subject for whom the ten actions were catalogued as “non-classifiable”, while
the remaining observations in this category are spreaded among 57% of the
participants.
4.4 Dissonance between recommendations
I define dissonance, Dit, as the difference between the outgoing and the in-
coming messages exchanged by subject i in round t. This concept is useful to
check for the tradeoff between responsiveness and consistency by computing
the correlations between extraction and dissonance levels. A positive corre-
lation will evidence consistency, as the extraction level is increasing with the
outgoing recommendation; while a negative correlation will give support to
responsiveness, as the extraction level increases with the incoming message.
However, it is also possible to find a mixed behavior that depends on
the sign of Dit. If the sign of the correlation matches the sign of the disso-
nance, it will be observed an opportunistic behavior characterized by subjects
following the maximum recommended level between the outgoing and the in-
coming message. The hypothetical opposite pattern, defined as the moralistic
or “Kantian” behavior, will correspond to subjects choosing the minimum
recommended level between the outgoing and the incoming message as the
“right thing to do.”
The relationship between dissonance and extraction is shown in Figure 4.
The circle size indicates the number of observations in a given position. The
linear fit is displayed separately for negative and positive values of dissonance
to identify the mixed behaviors defined above. The numerical correlations, as
well as their statistical significance, are reported in Table 5. I find evidence
of opportunistic behavior in the Cycle-1 and Star-E, while in the Cycle-E
and Cycle-8 the correlations are weak and, at most, marginally significant
in one case. By construction, for the Star-1 and Star-8 treatments the
dissonance levels only fall into the positive or negative domain, respectively.
As a consequence, in these two treatment cells I cannot identify opportunistic
or moralistic behaviors, only consistency or responsiveness.
Having in mind the partial evidence of responsiveness in the treatments
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Figure 4: Dissonance versus extraction level
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Cycle-1 and Star-E, I further explore if this behavior can explain the obser-
vations in which the outgoing recommendation is larger than the extracted
level. The last two columns of Table 5 report the correlations for the sub-
sample of observations with strictly negative consistency values.
I do not find evidence of responsiveness for this subsample in the two
treatments in which a negative correlation was reported for Dit ≤ 0, Cycle-1
and Star-E. However, I find a negative and statistically significant correlation
for positive dissonance in the Cycle-E. Responsiveness may explain extracted
levels below the recommended extraction only in a very particular case: in
a decentralized structure without exogenous messages, when the outgoing
recommendation exceeds the incoming one.
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Table 5: Correlations between dissonance and extraction levels
Treatment Full sample Consistency < 0
Dit ≤ 0 Dit ≥ 0 Dit ≤ 0 Dit ≥ 0
Cycle-E -0.018 0.062 0.509*** -0.323***
(0.828) (0.458) (0.001) (0.004)
Cycle-1 -0.466*** 0.253*** 0.785 0.295**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.115) (0.013)
Cycle-8 -0.085 0.195* 0.384** -0.106
(0.319) (0.071) (0.036) (0.441)
Star-E -0.192** 0.490*** 0.202 0.658***
(0.018) (0.000) (0.356) (0.000)
Star-1 0.277*** 0.816***
(0.000) (0.000)
Star-8 0.251*** 0.732***
(0.001) (0.000)
Outgoing exogenous recommendations excluded.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
4.5 Building a link with survey data
Up to this point there are clear signals of heterogeneous preferences for con-
sistency across the sample: the distribution of inconsistency is skewed to
the right in the treatments with lower extraction levels, predatory behavior
displays the lower variance between treatments, and the most extreme obser-
vations in the relationship between dissonance and extraction shown above
characterize the opportunistic behavior previsouly mentioned. In this sub-
section I explore the link between the subjects’ preferences for following their
own recommendation and the earnings they reported as satisfactory after a
journey.
Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) validate the relationship between experimen-
tal findings and field data with a sample of Brazilian fishermen and shrimpers.
They show a link between time and social preferences with the use of tech-
nologies that are more likely to exploit the common resource. I use the
information regarding the fishing technology (cast nets, drift nets, handlin-
ing or “others”8) as controls in the statistical regressions, but due to the large
variation in the employed technologies it is not possible to define an ordinal
arrangement from the best to the worst in terms of sustainability, as was
done by Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) using the eye size of the fishing nets.
One potential interpretation of the reported satisfactory earnings, the
closest to the existing literature, is to consider it as an indirect measure of
8In this category are grouped other fishing technologies reported less often such as
harpoon, harvesting mollusks or crabs, and fish-farming.
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impatience once we control for the average realized earnings. The underlying
assumption behind this interpretation is that the higher the amount required
to consider a journey of work as comforting, the more the impatient is the
fisherman.
Nevertheless, there are multiple alternative interpretations of the satis-
factory and realized daily earnings such as productivity levels or self-defined
goals. With respect to the productivity approach, it is not clear how to inter-
pret the large gap between satisfactory and realized earnings. The definition
of personal goals seems to be a more plausible interpretation. However, it
requires the assumption of systematic underachievement as part of the goal
setting process. A third potential interpretation involving the satisfactory
and realized earnings is that the gap between these two responses is a sig-
nal of the fishermen’s level of greed, which also offers a connection to the
preferences for consistency when deceiving could be individually beneficial.
I run an OLS regression to explain the Inconsistency Index (II) for each
subject as a function of the satisfatory earnings. The variables mentioned
above, realized earnings and fishing technology, are used as controls along
with some experimental variables such as treatment fixed effects and individ-
ual extraction during the second stage of the game (the ten rounds including
recommendations). The Inconsistency Index was defined as
II =
T∑
t=t0
{
xt − rt, if xt − rt ≥ 0
0, otherwise.
(2)
Intuitively, the inconsistency values are aggregated for each subject but
only when the outgoing recommendation is below the extraction level. This
is assumed to be an indicator of the intention to take advantage of other’s
cooperative behavior.
The coefficients from the OLS regression are reported in Table 6. In
columns (1) and (2) are shown the regression results when the satisfactory
earnings are directly introduced into the specification. When controls are
also included, the effect is no longer significant. As an alternative specifi-
cation, the ratio between satisfactory and average realized earnings is used
as independent variable. Estimation results are reported in columns (3) and
(4). It is easy to check that this specification of the satisfactory earnings is
robust to the introduction of controls.
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Table 6: Inconsistency index explained by satisfactory earnings (OLS results)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Satisfactory earnings 0.0537*** 0.0237
(0.0178) (0.0147)
Average realized earnings -0.107
(0.0767)
Satisfactory/Realized earnings 1.189*** 0.643**
(0.378) (0.270)
Constant 10.71*** -6.634** 9.152*** -8.797***
(0.989) (2.554) (1.335) (2.433)
Observations 130 129 129 129
R-squared 0.055 0.545 0.076 0.556
Controls included: Treatment fixed effects, total extraction per subject during the second
stage, fishermen’s technology. Exogenous nodes were excluded from the sample.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
5 Final remarks
I conduct an artifactual field experiment emulating the extraction of a CPR
with real fishermen from the Colombian Caribbean coast. It involves the
exchange of non-binding and anonymous recommendations between subjects
prior to their extraction decision. Recommendations were exchanged through
on one of two different and exogenous network structures. A star, with a cen-
tralized communication structure, or a cycle, a decentralized structure with-
out hierarchical nodes. In addition, the outgoing recommendations from one
of the nodes in the network were controlled exogenously. The predetermined
message could be a good recommendation, i.e. to encourage low extraction
levels; or a “bad” recommendation, i.e. to promote high extraction levels.
I find evidence supporting that preferences for consistency can be ex-
tended to the simultaneous exchange of recommendations in a CPR game.
These preferences are heterogeneous across the fishermen that took part of
the study, and they are positively correlated with the earnings considered
by them as satisfactory but not with the reported average realized earnings.
Three patterns revealed in our experimental results support this heterogene-
ity in preferences. First, the distributions of inconsistency are skewed to the
right in the treatment cells with lower extraction levels, the Star-E and Star-
1. Subjects with low disutility from being inconsistent free ride on the others’
cooperative behavior, exploiting the increase in the marginal utility of ex-
traction. Second, the relationship between dissonance and extraction reveals
a “U-shaped” pattern when low recommendations are more often. Extrac-
tion levels for low dissonance values are very distant from those observed for
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extreme dissonance values, suggesting the coexistence of consistent and coop-
erative individuals with inconsistent and self-regarding subjects. Third, from
the four behavioral types defined in Subsection 4.3, the predatory behavior
exhibits the lower between-treatments variance.
This last pattern brings into discussion if the preferences for consistency
are affected by environmental cues regarding aggregate behavior. By envi-
ronmental cues I define the exogenous variations in the expected extraction
levels induced by a combination of the network structure and the predefined
messages in a given treatment. In particular, are less cooperative environ-
ments capable of reducing the individual costs of being inconsistent? Do we
observe more inconsistent behavior when a bad recommendation is a public
signal?
I present evidence that cooperative and lie-averse behaviors, characterized
by low inconsistency, seem to be substitutes for a subsample of the experi-
mental participants. The lowest shares of lie-averse behavior are observed in
the three treatments with the largest percentage of cooperative behavior, the
cycle-1, star-E and star-1. More importantly, in the treatment with a public
bad recommendation, the star-8, a 56% drop in cooperative behavior is com-
pensated by a 210% increase in lie-averse behavior (with respect to the other
treatments). However, the drop in cooperative behavior is also correlated
with a 165% increase in the proportion of predators. In conclusion, I con-
tribute to the existing evidence of the sensitivity to contextual manipulations
in lying behavior Mazar et al. (2008), but this behavior is only exhibited by
a fraction of the subjects.
A question that emerges from the results reported on Subsection 4.2, and
that I was not able to address completely, is how to reconcile the existence
of negative inconsistency values with any kind of rationality, not necessarily
self-regarding motives. Under the assumption that messages are meaningful,
and are useful rather to coordinate or to induce an exploitable cooperative
behavior, the rationality behind choosing an extraction level below the out-
going recommendation is not clear. A salient explanation for this behavior
could have been the responsiveness to the incoming recommendation. If a
given subject considers that the incoming recommendation will lead to a pre-
ferred outcome with respect to its previous expected play, where “preferred”
may or may not include other-regarding motives, then this subject will ratio-
nally opt for following the message. However, as was shown in the exercise
analyzing the dissonance level with the extraction pattern (see Table 5), I
only find support for the responsiveness mechanism under very particular
and limited conditions.
Although it was not possible to offer a full explanation for the recurrent
negative inconsistency values, there are two patterns in the data that of-
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fer partial explanations of this behavior. First, selecting an extraction level
below the outgoing recommendation seems to have small costs for those sub-
jects that are more likely to cooperate. For 71% of the observations in which
inconsistency has a value of −1, the corresponding extraction levels reaches
at most two units. Second, I find a larger variance for inconsistency at the
within-subjects level rather than at the between-subjects level. The within-
subjects variance is 1.6 times larger than the between-subjects variance, and
this ratio increases to 2.0 for the subsample of observations with negative in-
consistency. In addition I find that 92 out of 120 participants (77%) extracted
below their suggestion at least in one of the ten rounds.
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Appendix
Experimental instructions
The following instructions were presented in Spanish to the players. These instructions
were read to the participants from the script below by the same person during all sessions.
The participants could interrupt and ask questions at any time. Whenever the following
type of text and font e.g. [. . .MONITOR: distribute PAYOFFS TABLE to participants.
. .] is found below, it refers to specific instructions to the monitor at that specific point.
Instructions
Greetings. We want to thank everyone here for attending the call, and special thanks to
the (local organization that helped in the logistics) that made this possible. We will spend
about two hours between explaining the exercise, playing it and finishing with a short
survey at the exit. So, let us get started.
The following exercise is a different and entertaining way of participating actively in a
project about the economic decisions of individuals. Besides participating in the exercise,
and being able to earn some cash, you will participate in a community workshop next
Monday (date and time of the meeting) to discuss the exercise and other matters about
natural resources. Once the game finishes, we will ask you some information about you
and your community, and then we will give you what you have earned during the game.
The funds to cover these expenditures have been donated by the Latin American and
Caribbean Environmental Economics Program.
Introduction
It is very important that while we explain the rules of the game you do not engage in con-
versations with other people in your group. This exercise attempts to recreate a situation
in which a group of families must make decisions about how to use the resources of, for
instance, the sea, a mangrove, a fishery, or any other case where communities use a natural
resource. In the case of this community, an example would be the extraction of (name of
a fish usually caught in the community) in the (name of an actual local commons area in
that village) zone. You have been selected to participate in a group of five people among
those who have signed up for playing. The game in which you will participate now is
different from the ones others have already played in this community; thus, the comments
that you may have heard from others do not apply necessarily to this game. You will
play for several rounds equivalent, for instance, to fishing trips. At the end of the game
you will receive your earnings in cash according to the amount of money you accumulate
during the exercise. Your earnings will be approximated to the closest multiple of $1,000
[. . .MONITOR: Give a couple of examples of how to approximate the game earnings. .
.]
The PAYOFFS TABLE
We call this game THE FISH MARKET given the similarity between the PAYOFFS
TABLE and the mechanism that assigns the price of the fish based on the aggregated
catch. [. . .MONITOR: Explain that when fish is abundant the price decreases and the
earnings per unit caught are reduced. As an analogy, explain that when fish is scarce its
price increases. After this basic explanation, ask participants what will happen with the
earnings of a hypothetical player with low extraction when the rest of the group has high
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levels of extraction. Similarly, ask participants about the inverse case. . .] If we have
understood the payoffs in each round, now we can introduce the PAYOFFS TABLE.
Table A.1: Payoffs table
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 2273 2370 2453 2520 2573 2610 2633 2640
5 2213 2310 2393 2460 2513 2550 2573 2580
6 2153 2250 2333 2400 2453 2490 2513 2520
7 2093 2190 2273 2340 2393 2430 2453 2460
8 2033 2130 2213 2280 2333 2370 2393 2400
9 1973 2070 2153 2220 2273 2310 2333 2340
10 1913 2010 2093 2160 2213 2250 2273 2280
11 1853 1950 2033 2100 2153 2190 2213 2220
12 1793 1890 1973 2040 2093 2130 2153 2160
13 1733 1830 1913 1980 2033 2070 2093 2100
14 1673 1770 1853 1920 1973 2010 2033 2040
15 1613 1710 1793 1860 1913 1950 1973 1980
16 1553 1650 1733 1800 1853 1890 1913 1920
17 1493 1590 1673 1740 1793 1830 1853 1860
18 1433 1530 1613 1680 1733 1770 1793 1800
19 1373 1470 1553 1620 1673 1710 1733 1740
20 1313 1410 1493 1560 1613 1650 1673 1680
21 1253 1350 1433 1500 1553 1590 1613 1620
22 1193 1290 1373 1440 1493 1530 1553 1560
23 1133 1230 1313 1380 1433 1470 1493 1500
24 1073 1170 1253 1320 1373 1410 1433 1440
25 1013 1110 1193 1260 1313 1350 1373 1380
26 953 1050 1133 1200 1253 1290 1313 1320
27 893 990 1073 1140 1193 1230 1253 1260
28 833 930 1013 1080 1133 1170 1193 1200
29 773 870 953 1020 1073 1110 1133 1140
30 713 810 893 960 1013 1050 1073 1080
31 653 750 833 900 953 990 1013 1020
32 593 690 773 840 893 930 953 960
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To be able to play you will receive a PAYOFFS TABLE equal to the one shown
in the poster. [. . .MONITOR: show PAYOFFS TABLE in poster and distribute PAY-
OFFS TABLES to participants. . .] This table contains all the information that you
need to make your decision in each round of the game, as we will see now. The numbers
that are inside the table correspond to the money that you would earn in each round.
To play in each round you must write your decision number between 1 and 8 on the yellow
GAME CARD like the one I am about to show you. [. . .MONITOR: show GAME
CARDS and show in the poster. . .] When you choose your desired level of extraction,
you are selecting the column of the PAYOFFS TABLE corresponding to the earnings
of the round. It is very important that we keep in mind that the decisions are absolutely
individual, that is, that the numbers we write in the GAME CARD are private and that
we do not have to show them to the rest of members of the group if we do not want to.
The monitor will collect the 5 GAME CARDS from all participants, and will add the
total units of extraction that the group has decided to allocate. The difference between
the total extraction of the group and your individual extraction will indicate the row in
the PAYOFFS TABLE to calculate your round earnings. Please remember, your level
of extraction indicates the column and the level of extraction of the rest of the group
indicates the row in the PAYOFFS TABLE. With this information, the monitor will
help calculate the points that you earned in the round, and you will write your earnings
in the DECISION FORM.
In this game we assume that each player extracts a maximum of 8 units of a resource like
fish or oysters. In reality this number could be larger or smaller, but for purposes of our
game we will assume 8 as maximum. In the PAYOFFS TABLE this corresponds to
25
the columns from 1 to 8. Each of you must decide from 1 to 8 in each round and, given
that you will only know your own decision, the monitor will publicly announce the group’s
total extraction. With this information you will be able to calculate your earnings using
the PAYOFFS TABLE. If you need help the monitor will calculate your payoff in each
round. Let us explain again with some examples. Suppose you decide to extract 2 units
and the monitor announces that the group extracted 22 units. Your earnings correspond
to the cell in the second column in which the rest of the group extracted 20 units. Let us
look at other examples in the poster [. . .MONITOR: show an example with each player.
Then, show more examples where participants explain to others how they calculate their
earnings].
The DECISIONS FORM (First Stage Rounds 1 to 5)
To play each participant will receive one green DECISIONS FORM like the one shown
in the poster in the wall. We will explain how to use this sheet. [. . .MONITOR: show
the DECISIONS FORM in the poster and distribute the DECISIONS FORMS. . .].
With the same examples, let us see how to use this DECISIONS FORM. Now, suppose
that you decided to play 2 units in this round. In the yellow GAME CARD you should
write 2. Also you must write this number in the second column of the decisions form. The
monitor will collect the 5 yellow cards, will add and will inform the total of the group.
In this example 22 units were extracted. He will help you complete the last two columns
of the DECISION FORM with the average extraction from the other players and your
period earnings.
It is very important to clarify that nobody, except for the monitor, will be able to know the
number that each of you decides in each round. The only thing announced in public is the
group total, without knowing how each participant in your group played. It is important
to repeat that your game decisions and earnings information are private. Nobody in your
group or outside of it will be able to know how many points you earned or your decisions
during rounds. If at this moment you have any question about how to earn points in the
game, please raise your hand and let us know. [. . .MONITOR: pause to resolve questions.
. .] If there are no further questions about the game, then we will assign the numbers for
the players and the rest of forms needed to play.
Preparing for playing
Now write down your player number and name in the DECISIONS FORM. Also write
the current date and time. Now we will summarize for you the steps to follow to play in
each round. Please raise your hand if you have a question. [MONITOR: Summarize the
steps to follow in each round. . .]
We will start with a practice round to test that the activity instructions have been under-
stood. The earnings from the practice round will NOT be included in the total earnings
of the game. After practicing the game in this initial round we will play for 15 rounds for
cash. Once we complete the fifth round we will pause to give you a new DECISIONS
FORM and to introduce a new rule in the activity. To start the first round of the game
we will organize the seats and desks to guarantee that your decisions and earnings in-
formation are private. Finally, to get ready to play the game, please let us know if you
have difficulties reading or writing numbers. If so, one of the monitors will sit next to
you and assist you with these. Also, please keep in mind that from now on there should
be no conversation nor should you make any statements during the game, unless you are
allowed to. We can now start with the practice round, the earnings of which will NOT
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count toward your real earnings, as they are just for practicing the game.
Given that we understand how the activity works, now we can proceed to sign the IN-
FORMED CONSENT that will be read now [. . .MONITOR: Read the INFORMED
CONSENT and verify that all participants sign it. . .]
The DECISIONS FORM (Second Stage Rounds 6 to 15)
We have completed Round 5 and, as we announced at the beginning of the exercise, we
will introduce a new rule. From now on you can send RECOMMENDATIONS with
the level of extraction desired from other players, in a number from 1 to 8. The number of
participants that will receive your message will depend on your location in the NEIGH-
BORS STRUCTURE shown in the poster. [. . . MONITOR: show the poster with the
NEIGHBORS STRUCTURE. . .] In this structure each one of you is represented by
one of the white circles labeled with the corresponding player number. These numbers will
allow you to determine your location and your connections to other participants. Each
one of the lines corresponds to a connection between two players. The number of lines will
indicate the number of connections for each one of you.
Remember that you will not be able to know the player number of the rest of players before,
during or after the conclusion of the game. This means that sent and received RECOM-
MENDATIONS will remain anonymous. To confirm that you have understood the
NEIGHBORS STRUCTURE the monitor will ask you about the connections of a
particular circle [. . .MONITOR: Use the poster to ask for the neighbors of a couple o
nodes. . .]
Now you will receive the new DECISIONS FORM like the one shown in the poster. [.
. . MONITOR: show the poster with the DECISIONS FORM and distribute the DECI-
SIONS FORM to participants. . .] This new form includes an extra column. Let’s see
how to use it according to the new rule of the game. At the beginning of each round, and
only if you want, you can write in the second column the UNITS OF EXTRACTION
that you recommend to your neighbors. In case you’d rather not send any recommen-
dation you should write “NO” in the second column. The monitor will collect all the
recommendations and he will privately show to each one of you the RECOMMENDA-
TIONS received using the MESSAGE EXCHANGING BOARD. [. . . MONITOR:
show the MESSAGE EXCHANGING BOARD. . .] You will be able to decide your
EXTRACTION LEVEL only after the monitor shows you the RECOMMENDA-
TIONS sent to you.
It is important to clarify that sending or receiving a particular RECOMMENDATION
does not imply any kind of commitment from you or from any other participant. You’re
not obligated to follow the sent or received RECOMMENDATION; hence, if you want
you can extract a different level from this RECOMMENDATION.
The rest of the DECISIONS FORM will be completed as in the first part of the game.
You will write your LEVEL OF EXTRACTION in the third column and in theGAME
CARD. The monitor will collect the five GAME CARDS and will announce the total
extraction of the group. Finally, the monitor will help you complete the last two columns
of the DECISIONS FORM with the extraction of the rest of the group and your earn-
ings of the round.
Remember that your decisions and earnings information are private, and not even your
neighbors according to the NEIGHBORS STRUCTURE will access this information.
The new rule of the game introduces a preliminary step in each round to exchange REC-
OMMENDATIONS according to the NEIGHBORS STRUCTURE. After this step
each round will be similar to the first stage of the activity. Please remember that you’re
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not obligated to send a RECOMMENDATION, and that these messages do not di-
rectly affect your earnings. If at this moment you have any question about how to earn
points in the game, please raise your hand and let us know. [. . .MONITOR: pause to
resolve questions. . .]
Now write down your player number and name in the new DECISIONS FORM. We
will next summarize for you the steps to follow to play in each round. Please raise your
hand if you have a question. [MONITOR: Summarize the steps to follow in each round. .
.] We will play with the new rule for another ten rounds.
Flipping a coin to determine the exogenous RECOMMENDATION (Player
A only)
You have been selected to play a special role in this game: your sent RECOMMEN-
DATION will be determined by a coin toss. You will toss this coin. If the coin lands on
this side (heads) during the next 10 rounds you will send a RECOMMENDATION to
extract 1 UNIT. If the coin lands on this side (tails) during the next 10 rounds you will
send a RECOMMENDATION to extract 8 UNITS. Please bear in mind that the coin
indicates the RECOMMENDATION that you must send, but you can freely choose
your desired level of extraction. Please take into account that NOBODY BUT YOU
knows that you were selected to play this role in the game. Only you know that your sent
RECOMMENDATION will be determined by the COIN FLIPPING.
If you don’t have any more questions please flip the coin I’ve just given you to determine
your RECOMMENDATION to the other players. [. . . MONITOR: Give the coin to
the participant, observe the outcome and confirm that the player’s RECOMMENDA-
TION procedure is clear. . .]
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